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A HEALTHY AMOUNT OF PRIVACY:
QUANTIFYING PRIVACY CONCERNS IN
MEDICINE
IGNACIO N. COFONE*
ABSTRACT
With recent developments in e-health, concerns have been raised regarding the
privacy of patients who are monitored with such treatments. I propose a simple
method to incorporate these concerns into a standard health impact evaluation, based
on Quality Adjusted Life Years and the Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio. This
method provides a way to objectively value privacy concerns and balance them with
health benefits. Hence, it can guide doctors and policymakers into incorporating
privacy considerations and making better choices regarding e-health programs. This
method can also be tested on existing economic evaluations to compare outcomes
and gauge the extent to which privacy issues in medical treatments should be taken
seriously.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With recent developments in technical means of patient surveillance, particularly
involving patients under observation with distance-monitoring treatments, concerns
have been raised regarding the privacy of people monitored with such treatments.1
For these treatments to be operational, a significant amount of personal, and often
sensitive, information about the patient is sent electronically to the medical
professionals or, more frequently, to a team of people involving both medical
professionals and other actors.2 This information is sometimes sent together with
other pieces of information, such as location data, which are not strictly necessary to
treat the patient; nevertheless, the devices pick up such information.3 Consequently,
a relevant drawback that these treatments present is that they cause a reduction of
personal privacy and an increased risk of privacy breaches. These privacy concerns
are not considered at the moment of evaluating their incorporation to patient
treatments.
An example of a remote patient monitoring method used by several hospitals in
the U.S. is the use of electronic intensive care units (e-ICUs or tele-ICUs).
Caregivers distantly monitor patients in e-ICUs through a set of cameras,
microphones, other electronic monitoring systems, and smart alarms.4 E-ICUs,
which are among the first types of remote patient monitoring treatments, are also
among the most harmless to privacy. While this healthcare platform reduces
healthcare costs,5 it also arguably reduces patients’ privacy.6 Another widespread
device that is part of this category is wearable sensors. While these are usually used
by caregivers to monitor patients from a distance, they are sometimes purchased
directly by individuals to track their own health data as well, with no healthcare
professional involved.7
1

JOHN CAREY, POWER TO THE PATIENT: HOW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY
HEALTHCARE 2-4 (Frieda Klotz ed., 2015).
2

See id. at 16.

3

See id. at 10.

IS

TRANSFORMING

4

Leo Celi et al., The eICU: It’s Not Just Telemedicine, 29 CRITICAL CARE MED. N183,
N184-87 (2001) (Suppl.); Brian A. Rosenfeld et al., Intensive Care Unit Telemedicine:
Alternate Paradigm for Providing Continuous Intensivist Care, 28 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3925,
3925 (2000).
5
This reduction in costs is not a minor point, as it allows for the delivery of better
healthcare to a larger number of people. Consequently, the World Health Organization has
endorsed mobile health as a means of expanding affordable healthcare. Alastair van Heerda et
al., Point of Care in Your Pocket: A Research Agenda for the Field of mHealth, 90 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORGAN. (2012).
6

Celi et al., supra note 4, at N187.

7

See GINA NEFF & DAWN NAFUS, SELF-TRACKING (2016) (explaining the increasing
tendency of self-tracking health data). The Nightscout project, for example, is a startup that
sells a smart watch, marketed to parents of children with diabetes, that acts as a continuous
glucose monitor and provides real-time access to its data from different devices. See Welcome
to Nightscout, THE NIGHTSCOUT PROJECT, http://www.nightscout.info/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2016). There is a wide array of fitness trackers that work in a similar way, such as Fitbit and
Jawbone. Broadly speaking, this type of practice has been called consumer health informatics.
See THOMAS WETTER, INT’L MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N, WORKING GROUP CONSUMER HEALTH
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E-health, which combines these methods of electronic monitoring (called remote
patient monitoring or telemedicine) with internet-supported electronic health records,
has raised patients’ concerns.8 About half of respondents in a recent survey believe
that consumers’ wariness about privacy violations will be a major obstacle for the
adoption of mobile technology in healthcare.9 In addition, over half of respondents
consider privacy risks to be the biggest concern of these technologies’ application to
healthcare.10 Moreover, the patient is not the only person whose privacy may be
compromised by a telemedicine application. Home monitors, for example, also affect
others in the home. Privacy concerns in e-health are of central importance to the
public.
The lack of an objective way of taking privacy concerns into consideration when
evaluating health policies underplays how much a loss of privacy can harm people
and how much value people attribute to personal privacy. Moreover, this
insufficiency is worrisome not only to privacy scholars, but also to proponents of ehealth policies. Unaddressed privacy concerns can lead (and in occasions have led)
to the halt of new and potentially advantageous treatments.11 Harms to individual
privacy, however, are difficult to observe and measure.12
This article proposes a simple way to incorporate privacy considerations into a
standard health impact evaluation. Privacy concerns could be incorporated into the
Quality-Adjusted Life Year framework (QALY) and the Incremental CostEffectiveness Ratio framework (ICER)—to which QALY can then be incorporated.
QALY measures the quality and quantity of life improvements per medical
treatment.13 ICER measures the costs of medical treatments compared to their
INFORMATICS REPORT AUGUST 2013 TO AUGUST 2014 (2014),
medinfo.org/new2/sites/default/files/IMIA_WG-ConsHI_Rep2014.pdf.

http://www.imia-

8

While there is no unified definition of e-health, all uses of the term refer to the
interaction between healthcare and new technologies, especially the internet. See Hans Oh et
al., What Is eHealth (3): A Systematic Review of Published Definitions, 7 J. MED. INTERNET
RES. 1, 4-6 (2005); G. Eysenbach, What is e-health?, 3 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 20, 20 (2001).
The two most prominent facets of this concept are remote patient monitoring and internetsupported electronic health records. This makes it narrower than health informatics or health
information technology. Claudia Pagliari et al., What Is eHealth (4): A Scoping Exercise to
Map the Field, 7 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 1, 10 (2005). For the purposes of this article, this
concept includes mobile health, which involves remote patient monitoring by mobile devices.
See Sofia Ranchordás & Bonnie Kaplan, MHealth for Alzheimer’s Disease: Regulation,
Consent, and Privacy Concerns, in SHLOMIT YANISKY-RAVID, BEYOND IP: THE FUTURE OF
PRIVACY (Fordham U. Press, forthcoming 2017).
9

CAREY, supra note 1, at 4, 14.

10

Id.

11

See infra Section V.C.

12

See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1893 (2011); Daniel
J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 747, 754 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1087, 1088 (2002).
13
See Joseph S. Pliskin et al., Utility Functions for Life Years and Health Status, 28
OPERATIONS RES. 206, 206 (1980); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for
Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1976); see also infra Section III.A.
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effects, allowing for a comparison between treatments with different modalities.14
The method proposed here estimates the dimension of privacy harms for patients
and, in such a way, complements the privacy impact assessments analyses of how
information is collected, stored, and disseminated.
In order to do this, this article proposes performing an estimation of the privacycost per treatment, contingent on the type of personal information involved. It
suggests performing this estimation with a similar methodology to those used to
evaluate QALY in health economics: Visual Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, and
Time-Trade-Off. These evaluation methods capture the subjective views of patients
and, therefore, the patients’ subjective harm. Such costs can either be used to weigh
the QALY factor in itself or can be weighed together with health risks and monetary
costs when evaluating the disadvantages of treatments in the ICER health impact
evaluation. This application can be helpful to objectively value privacy concerns
when balanced against health benefits. In doing so, it can guide policymakers into
making better choices regarding e-health programs by incorporating privacy
considerations when evaluating treatments. At a more abstract level, this analysis
allows one to gauge the extent to which privacy should be taken seriously in ehealth.
Section II of this article reviews the experimental literature that attempts to
determine how much people value their privacy. Section III reviews QALY, ICER,
and the tools used to measure health state valuations: Visual Analogue Scale,
Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off. This article suggests these methods and
tools should be used to measure privacy concerns. Drawing from the previous two
sections, Section IV explains how to incorporate privacy concerns in costeffectiveness analyses; in order to do that, the section compares possible methods for
evaluating privacy concerns under this framework, through monetary costs and
health states. Section V presents further reasons and rationale to incorporate the
proposed policy, particularly due to methodological concerns, policy considerations,
and doctrinal implications. Section VI concludes this article.
II. HOW MUCH IS PRIVACY WORTH
A. Experimental Literature
The easiest way to determine how much privacy is worth would be to know the
magnitude of privacy harms and add them to the social cost of any treatment.
However, the experimental literature on privacy has found it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to determine how much privacy is worth. The “privacy paradox”
describes the phenomenon in which people declare a high value for their private
information in surveys, but in incentivized experiments, individuals disclose their
information for low compensations.15 The studies on how much people value their
privacy show inconsistencies between declared privacy values and privacy-related
14

See Scott Ramsey et al., Good Research Practices for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Alongside Clinical Trials: The ISPOR RCT-CEA Task Force Report, 8 VALUE HEALTH 521
(2005); see also infra Section III.C.
15

Bettina Berendt et al., Privacy in E-Commerce: Stated Preferences vs. Actual Behavior,
48 COMM. ACM 101, 102, 104 (2005); Sarah Spiekermann et al., E-privacy in 2nd Generation
E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior, in PROC. OF THE 3RD ACM
CONFERENCE: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 38, 45 (2001).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss1/5

4

2016]

A HEALTHY AMOUNT OF PRIVACY

5

behavior online.16 Privacy concerns are a weak predictor of the amount of personal
information disclosed.17
Inconsistencies go beyond declared values. Independent from the inconsistencies
mentioned, people display a low willingness to pay for safeguards on their personal
information.18 Individuals’ valuations display a gap between the willingness to pay
to protect information and the willingness to accept to sell information in
experiments.19 In surveys, the average willingness to accept payment for personal
information is five times higher than the willingness to pay to protect private
information (WTA:WTP ratio of 5.47).20 This almost doubles the average ratio for
other goods (2.92).21
Privacy valuations present some patterns, but they are scarce. People value their
offline information, such as facts about themselves, three times more than online
information, such as their browsing patterns.22 Regarding offline information, people
value the protection of undesirable traits more than that of desirable traits, even
when these lead to no direct pecuniary changes.23 More importantly for the topic at
hand, people value information about their medical status the most, along with
financial information and information about their family.24
Context is also extremely relevant for people when deciding whether to disclose
information. When decisions on privacy become simpler, people tend to show a
higher valuation of privacy, closer to the valuation disclosed on surveys.25 In the
same vein, when security settings and privacy risks are more visible, for example on

16

Spiekermann et al., supra note 15, at 45; Berendt et al., supra note 15, at 102, 104.

17

Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information
Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 36, 36 (G. Danezis & P. Golle eds.,
2006); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual
Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 26 (2005).
18

Alastair Beresford et al., Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment, 117
ECON. LETTERS 25, 26-27 (2012).
19
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’
Understanding of Behavioral Advertising, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH
CONFERENCE 1, 25-26 (2010).
20

Alessandro Acquisti et al., What is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 267-68
(2013).
21

Id. at 268.

22

Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., Your Browsing Behavior for a Big Mac: Economics of
Personal Information Online, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
WORLD WIDE WEB 189, 189 (2013).
23

Bernardo Huberman et al., Valuating Privacy, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 22, 22
(2005).
24
Daniel Horne & David Horne, Domains of Privacy: Toward an Understanding of
Underlying Factors, in DIRECT MARKETING EDUCATORS’ CONFERENCE (1998).
25

Luc Wathieu & Allan Friedman, An Empirical Approach to Understanding Privacy
Valuation 1-6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-075, 2007).
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internet browsers, people react with an increased protection of their information.26
People value having control over the publicity of their personal information.27
However, in the medical context, at least for mobile applications, it is rarely the case
that privacy policies make privacy concerns visible.28
B. We Cannot Monetize Privacy
This risk of privacy breaches represents the disutility of any use that can be made
with the traded information that is unpleasant to the person; hence, an individual
should take it into account as an expected cost when deciding whether to disclose.
Therefore, the materialization of such risk can take many forms, the most common
ones ranging from mostly harmless annoyances, such as receiving spam email, to
more serious consequences, such as public disclosure of embarrassing information or
the acquisition of information by medical insurers or future employers that would
financially damage the person, identity fraud, or identity theft.
When data controllers trade someone’s personal information, that person has an
increased risk of suffering a privacy breach.29 The user will have his or her personal
data out of his or her range of control, but its use by others still has the potential of
impacting the individual’s welfare negatively, which means that there are
externalities in data trading. These externalities imply an incentive for other actors to
overuse the information.30 An example of actors that can impact a person’s welfare
can be advertising companies, social networks, or, in the case of medical data,
medical professionals and insurance companies.
Moreover, people care not only about direct harm, but also about the indirect
consequences that the transmission of their personal information can imply,
particularly about how their information will be used, even if it will have no direct
consequences for them (such as spam, fraud, or identity theft).31
As observed, people’s reactions to privacy decisions change depending on a
particular decision’s complexity.32 When information about privacy threats becomes
visible, people sometimes respond to the threat by choosing higher privacy

26

Julia Gideon et al., Power Strips, Prophylactics, and Privacy, Oh My!, in PROCEEDINGS
SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 133-40 (2006); Janice Tsai et
al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental
Study, 22 INFO. SYS. RES. 254, 263 (2011); Victoria Groom & Ryan Calo, Reversing the
Privacy Paradox: An Experimental Study, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH
CONFERENCE 1-9 (2011).
OF THE SECOND

27

Leslie John et al., Strangers on a Plane: Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive
Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858, 859 (2011).
28
Ali Sunyaev et al., Availability and Quality of Mobile Health App Privacy Policies, 22
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 28, 28 (2015).
29
John Hagel & Jeffrey Rayport, The Coming Battle for Consumer Information, 75 HARV.
BUS. REV. 53, 53 (1997).
30

Peter Swire & Robert Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic
Commerce and the European Privacy Directive, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 683, 684 (1998).
31

Wathieu & Friedman, supra note 25, at 7.

32

Id. at 2; John et al., supra note 27, at 268.
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protections.33 Many times, people do not understand privacy policies and license
agreements34 and the available privacy protection tools.35 Protecting privacy requires
technical skills that few people have.36 This necessity can largely explain the
contradicting results of the experimental literature and the difficulties in identifying a
single monetary value for privacy.37
For this reason, if personal data are treated equally in experimental settings and
security settings and privacy risks are not visible, contradicting results might be
reached.38 This issue highlights the usefulness of the proposal made in this article,
which focuses on visibility and one particular type of personal information: health
data.
III. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS
A. Quality Adjusted Life Years
In the face of limited budgets for healthcare spending and multiple potential
treatments that could be funded, the use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) has
become widespread in medical decision-making.39 For example, the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence in England, the body responsible for offering
guidance on the medical spending of public funds, has fully embedded the CEA
methodology into its decision-making processes.40 CEA is a formal procedure based
on estimations of the costs and benefits of each treatment. Its fundamental idea is to
choose health interventions that offer the greatest benefit for the smallest costs. In
the simplest case, if treatment A cures a condition at cost x and treatment B cures it at
cost y, and y<x, then treatment B is preferred over treatment A.
Several problems arise when comparing health outcomes across potential
treatments. Perhaps most importantly, one must determine how to compare the
outcomes of two different health technologies that affect different aspects of a
patient’s health. For example, one medication may lower cholesterol levels while
another may provide pain relief. These two medicines would be difficult to compare
along a single scale.
33

Gideon et al., supra note 26, at 142; Tsai et al., supra note 26, at 254.

34

George Milne & Mary Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why
Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15,
23 (2004).
35

Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 17.

36

Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System is Broken, ANNENBERG PUB.
POL’Y CTR. U. PA. 25 (2003).
37
Ignacio Cofone, The Value of Privacy: Keeping the Money Where the Mouth Is 1-5
(Rotterdam Inst. Law & Econ., RILE Working Paper No. 2014-15, 2015).
38

Wathieu & Friedman, supra note 25, at 2.

39
David O. Meltzer & Peter C. Smith, Theoretical Issues Relevant to the Economic
Evaluation of Health Technologies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 433-34 (Mark V.
Pauly et al. eds., 2011).
40
S. Bryan et al., Seeing the NICE Side of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: A Qualitative
Investigation of the Use of CEA in NICE Technology Appraisals, 16 HEALTH ECON. 179, 179
(2007).
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In order to rank treatments on a comparable scale, researchers use the concept of
QALYs.41 A QALY represents the value of living one year in a perfect health
condition, and this baseline is used as a proxy for the quality of one’s life during that
year.42 To be precise, the benefit of a particular treatment is translated into the gain
in QALYs that the treatment is expected to provide. Quality-adjusted life-years are
used, rather than simply life-years, in order to account for the fact that both the
duration and quality of an individual’s life matter. In our example of pain-lowering
and cholesterol-lowering medications, while the cholesterol medication may extend
life by three more years, the improved quality of life offered by the reduction in pain
might give us a reason to favor this intervention instead.
Quality of life or health status is typically scored between 0 and 1, with 0
representing death and 1 representing perfect health.43 Consider a person who will
live during a four-year timespan with a health status scored at 0.5. During those four
years, this individual will have experienced two QALYs. Since a QALY represents a
year lived in perfect health, this four-year window is considered the equivalent of
living two years in perfect health. An example of the QALYs that a standard person
has over a lifetime is shown below in Figure 1. As an individual’s age increases,
especially in advanced years, his or her health status falls. In this example, the
individual lived T years. The individual’s QALYs for each year are equal to the
shaded area under the curve, which will obviously be smaller than 1 and will reach 0
at time T.

Figure 1: Example of QALYs over a lifetime

41

Meltzer & Smith, supra note 39, at 439; J. Brazier et al., A Review of the Use of Health
Status Measures in Economic Evaluation, 3 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT 1, 3 (1999).
42
Brazier et al., supra note 41; Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health Related Quality of
Life for Use in Re-Source Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 1723-26 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
43

Dolan, supra note 42, at 1726.
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The next question that naturally arises is how one can quantitatively measure a
person’s quality of life. The topic of measuring health utilities, as well as more
general utilities, has been largely debated in health economics.44 In practice, three
main tools are used to elicit health utility scores: Visual Analogue Scale, Standard
Gamble, and Time Trade-off.45
B. Valuing Health States
A vital step in CEA is the valuation of health states, which allows the calculation
of QALYs. The three main tools used to elicit these health utility scores are the
Visual Analogue Scale, the Standard Gamble, and the Time-Trade-Off. Each method
begins with the description of the health state that the researcher needs to value.46 In
order for the results to be as generalizable as possible and to avoid any
preconceptions about certain illnesses, the description is usually very general. Rather
than naming actual conditions or diseases, health states are often given in terms of
several different “dimensions” of health and well-being, such as mobility, self-care,
ability of perform everyday tasks, pain or discomfort, and mental health.47 An
example of a health state is given in Box 1.
Health State A

•
•
•
•
•

You	
  have	
  poor	
  mobility	
  
You	
  have	
  some	
  problems	
  washing	
  and	
  dressing	
  yourself	
  
You	
  have	
  some	
  problems	
  with	
  performing	
  your	
  usual	
  
activities	
  
You	
  experience	
  moderate	
  pain	
  or	
  discomfort	
  
You	
  are	
  not	
  anxious	
  or	
  d epressed	
  

Box 1: Example of a health state
The Visual Analogue Scale simply asks individuals to pinpoint visually on a
scale from 0 to 100 how much they would value the health state described above,
where 0 is equivalent to death and 100 is equivalent to perfect health.48 The average
value pointed by individuals is then directly translated to QALYs. An example of the
Visual Analogue Scale is depicted in Box 2 below.49
44

See generally ECONOMIC EVALUATION IN HEALTH CARE: MERGING THEORY WITH
PRACTICE (M.F. Drummond & A. McGuire eds., 2001) (discussing theoretical underpinnings
of economic evaluations of health care).
45

Paul Dolan & Matthew Sutton, Mapping Visual Analogue Scale Health State Valuations
onto Standard Gamble and Time Trade-off Values, 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 1519, 1519 (1997).
These methods are further explained in the following subsection.
46
Paul Dolan et al., Valuing Health States: A Comparison of Methods, 15 J. HEALTH
ECON. 209, 210 (1996).
47

Id. at 215; Dolan & Sutton, supra note 45, at 1519, 1521.

48

David Parkin & Nancy Devlin, Is There a Case for Using Visual Analogue Scale
Valuations in Cost-Utility Analysis?, 15 HEALTH ECON. 653, 655 (2006).
49

The line is often portrayed vertically, although this is not uniform.
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Box 2: Visual Analogue Scale
In a Standard Gamble, on the other hand, people compare two situations, the
described health state and perfect health in order to elicit from their answer their
perceptions on the relative merit of those situations.50 The QALY value is
established by the lowest probability of living in perfect health that people consider
to be high enough to take the treatment that “cures” them from the described health
state.51 For example, if patient A is indifferent between living with chronic migraines
and taking a treatment that will (i) cure his or her migraines with a probability of
95% and (ii) cause death with a probability of 5%, then the QALY value of the
treatment is 0.95. The Standard Gamble method presents individuals with a
described scenario such as the following:52
“Imagine you are currently experiencing health state A. There is a
treatment available that, if successful, will allow you to return back to
perfect health. The treatment has probability p of being successful.
However, there is probability 1-p that the treatment fails and kills you. At
what probability (p) would you be indifferent between taking the treatment
and not taking the treatment?”
Box 3: Standard Gamble
Mathematically, one tries to elicit the following equality from the individual.
𝑈 𝐻! = 𝑝 𝑈(𝐻!"##  !"#$%! ) + 1 − 𝑝 𝑈(𝐻!"#$! )
Where 𝑈(. ) is the individual’s utility function. Given that 𝑈(𝐻!"##  !"#$%! ) = 1
and  𝑈 𝐻!"#$! = 0  , the utility of 𝐻! is then given by p. The intuition behind this
is that, if someone under the described health state would be willing to risk death
with a probability of 5% to obtain perfect health for a year, then that health state is
for them 95% as good as perfect health.
The Time-Trade-Off method, in turn, takes time into account. In this method,
respondents make a choice similar to that of the Standard Gamble, but among a
number of years in perfect health (X) versus a number of years with the health
problem (Y), and the ratio among them (X:Y) determines the QALY value.53 If the
50

Brazier et al., supra note 41, at 37.

51

Milton C. Weinstein et al., QALYs: The Basics, 12 VALUE HEALTH 55, 55, 58 (2009).

52

Id. at 57.

53

Id.
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patient A from the example above is indifferent between living for 50 more years
with migraines and living 40 more years in perfect health, then the QALY value of
the treatment is 0.8. Time-Trade-Off presents individuals with a scenario such as the
following:54
“Imagine you are currently experiencing health state A. You are given the
following choice. You can either continue to live in health state A for 10
years, at which point you will die. Alternatively, you can give up some of
these 10 years and live n years in perfect health (where n<10). At what
number of years (n) would you be indifferent between the two
alternatives?”
Box 4: Time Trade-off
Mathematically:
𝑈 𝐻! ∗ 10 = 𝑈 𝐻!"##  !"#$%! ∗ 𝑛
Again, given that 𝑈(𝐻!"##  !"#$%! ) = 1, the utility of 𝐻! is then given by 𝑛/10.
In this way, QALYs can, albeit imperfectly, quantify dimensions of different
health states and diverse treatments, such as pain, that are otherwise unquantifiable.
QALYs give policymakers and health professionals a framework to take these
dimensions into account and evaluate treatments more accurately without
disregarding either the dimension or the treatment.
C. Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio
Once a program’s benefits have been translated into gains in QALYs, the ICER
is calculated.55 This ratio measures the incremental cost of the incremental gain of
program A compared with program B.56 In the formula below, 𝑄! and 𝑄! are the
QALY values associated with programs A and B, respectively, and 𝐶! and 𝐶! are the
costs associated with them.
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅 =

𝑄! − 𝑄!
𝐶! − 𝐶!

In practice, new programs are compared to the “usual care” of patients who are
targeted by the treatment.57 In the representation above, the usual care would be
program A. In the example of a new cholesterol medication, the new treatment would
be compared to the medication that is currently used to lower cholesterol. If a
medication were completely novel, in the sense that it is designed to treat a condition
for which there currently exists no standard treatment, the comparison parameter
would be “no care.”58
54

Id.

55
Andrew H. Briggs et al., Pulling Cost-Effectiveness Analysis up by Its Bootstraps: A
Non-Parametric Approach to Confidence Interval Estimation, 6 HEALTH ECON. 327, 327
(1997).
56

Id.

57

Meltzer & Smith, supra note 39.

58

Id.
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ICER can be thought of as the dollar cost per each additional QALY point when
moving from treatment A to B. Decision-makers can therefore use ICER values to
select the most cost-effective treatments. The lower the ICER value is, the more
cost-effective the treatment is compared to others that achieve equivalent results.
If there is a given healthcare budget to spend, programs can be ranked inversely
in terms of their ICER values and implemented until the budget is depleted, thereby
maximizing health benefits within a given budget constraint. An alternative approach
in the situation where there is no budget constraint is to compare each ICER to a
threshold value that can be thought of as the maximum amount that a government is
willing to spend on each additional QALY.
IV. PLACING PRIVACY IN COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSES
A. Quantification Based on Monetary Costs
To operationalize the proposed change, it is theoretically possible to embed
privacy concerns into either the numerator or the denominator of the ICER
equation—which is the ratio of the change in QALYs and in the costs of an
intervention. Given these considerations, there seem to be two ways to incorporate
privacy concerns into ICER evaluations. The first way to incorporate privacy
concerns is to include privacy in the costs of health treatments. The second is to
include privacy concerns as a moderating element in the benefit section of ICER
evaluations—that is, within QALYs themselves.
Incorporating privacy issues as part of the monetary costs of a medical
intervention is an intuitive idea. After all, by virtue of presenting privacy disutilities
or potential privacy harms to patients who are being monitored, e-health treatments
have an extra cost, even if non-monetary. If one cares about the well-being of those
patients or about social welfare, there is no reason why, at the moment of evaluating
the costs of these treatments, one should take into account the costs of treatments for
hospitals but not the costs for patients themselves.
However, incorporating privacy concerns in the cost section of ICER evaluations
presents the obstacle of the indeterminacy of the privacy concerns’ monetization.
Monetizing privacy, as illustrated in Section II’s review of the experimental
literature, is at best a difficult task.59 Surveys and experiments have given
inconsistent results regarding how much to value privacy.60 More importantly,
experiments with different designs have given inconsistent values among
themselves, so one cannot attribute the inconsistency to a dissonance between
declared and revealed preferences.61
There are ways to partially, although not totally, overcome the problem of the
indeterminacy of the privacy concerns’ monetization. The lessons learned from the
experimental literature allow researchers to perform new experiments that are
restricted to the context of e-health in particular. These new, restricted experiments
could potentially give more accurate values for personal information, albeit still
approximate, that could help implement privacy concerns. To do this, two chief
issues should be kept in mind: the variable value of different types of information
and the effects of privacy risk awareness.
59

See supra Section II.

60

Acquisti et al., supra note 20, at 251-52.

61

See supra Section II.
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The first lesson from the literature is that people value different kinds of
information differently, so estimations on the value of information cannot be made
on abstract notions such as “privacy” or “personal information.” Rather, they must
be narrower. Sub-categories, such as “offline information” or “sensitive
information,” are already a step in the right direction, but the use of sub-categories is
likely insufficient to acquire useful results, as the sub-categories still include various
types of information that people could value differently. In this way, one could
conduct experiments regarding different kinds of information that are necessary for
different treatments under evaluation. Location data is a good candidate because it is
specific enough for people to have a realistic representation of it during the
experiment, and this type of data is included in several e-health treatments.
The second lesson from the stream of literature is that privacy concerns are not
always visible in experimental designs. Because privacy concerns are not always
visible in experimental designs, they may lead to results that point to very low
privacy valuations. The showing of low privacy valuations does not necessarily
result because people actually attributed little value to the type of personal
information involved, but it can also result because the individuals were not fully
aware of the risks that the disclosure involved. If experiments are run in the context
of e-health, they should make sure that the privacy costs involved are visible to the
subjects.
Keeping the two lessons garnered from the literature in mind, it is possible to run
incentivized experiments specifically aimed at arriving at a monetary price for
privacy concerns related to different types of health data. The very nature of health
data might make it easier to tackle both of the lessons mentioned and conduct
experiments with specific types of personal information and visible privacy costs.
Experiments gauging the value of privacy in e-health, from this perspective, could
also potentially shed more light onto the “privacy paradox.”
It would be difficult to know in advance if the experiments gauging the value of
privacy in e-health would give higher or lower valuations than those conducted
previously because two effects that run in opposite directions are present. On one
hand, decisions in e-health typically include more sensitive information than
decisions in shopping simulations. One may expect individuals to become sensitive
regarding their private information when it consists of data regarding medical
history. In expectation, an individual’s privacy is more reduced when facing a data
leak regarding information about one’s potential diseases than when facing a leak
regarding one’s shopping patterns, even if the latter could also lead in turn to more
sensitive information. The distinction between health information and information
regarding standard shopping patterns could lead people to disclose less than average
in privacy-related experiments.
On the other hand, decisions in e-health typically have a larger trade-off than
decisions in shopping simulations. The health benefits that e-health treatments
provide over standard treatments are, on average, significantly more valuable than
the shopping discounts used in traditional privacy experiments. It is not equally
beneficial to reduce one’s possibility of having a heart attack or appropriate
maintenance of a lupus condition than having the ability to save a few dollars when
purchasing a blow dryer. This difference in long-term benefits could lead people to
choose to disclose more information in the e-health context.
If such experiments did indeed give sensible and theoretically consistent
estimates of the monetary costs of the reduction of privacy that an e-health treatment
implies, it would become a relatively simple task to include these values in ICER
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ratios. The only task to be performed would be to add the experimentally estimated
monetary costs of privacy to the 𝐶! and 𝐶! values in the denominator of the ICER
ratio. There is, however, a simpler and cheaper way to quantify privacy concerns in
e-health treatments.
B. Quantification Based on Health States
Monetizing privacy concerns would be difficult even with the best practices
described. For this reason, this article proposes an alternative valuation method:
embedding privacy costs within QALYs. Privacy costs can be embedded within the
numerator, not the denominator, of the ICER ratio. This would imply using slightly
altered versions the Health States measured by the Visual Analogue Scale, Standard
Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off methods.
To accomplish the task of embedding privacy costs within QALYs, a probability
of the data becoming public can be included in the descriptions of the health states
on which the Visual Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off
operate. Imagine that a new medical intervention is available for a particular illness.
This intervention (intervention A) raises a patient’s health from 𝐻! to 𝐻! (where
𝐻! > 𝐻! ). However, the intervention also involves continuous external collection of
the patient’s sensitive data, such as heart rate and location. In order to assess the
utility of this treatment, the privacy concerns of patients should be taken into
account. And a slight alteration of the traditional Visual Analogue Scale, Standard
Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off methods can easily measure patients’ privacy
concerns. As before, each of these methods would begin with description of the
health state under inspection, 𝐻! . However, in addition to the traditional
“dimensions” of health, the health state would also describe the data being collected,
state who has access to the data, and estimate the risk level (r) of a data breach. Box
5 illustrates the suggested health state description.
Health State A’

You	
  have	
  poor	
  mobility	
  
You	
  have	
  some	
  problems	
  washing	
  and	
  dressing	
  yourself	
  
You	
  have	
  some	
  problems	
  with	
  performing	
  your	
  u sual	
  
activities	
  
• You	
  experience	
  moderate	
  pain	
  or	
  discomfort	
  
• You	
  are	
  not	
  anxious	
  or	
  d epressed	
  
• Data	
  on	
  your	
  heart	
  rate	
  is	
  being	
  collected	
  
• Data	
  on	
  your	
  location	
  is	
  being	
  collected	
  
• Your	
  doctor	
  and	
  other	
  employees	
  of	
  the	
  hospital	
  have	
  
access	
  to	
  these	
  data	
  
• There	
  is	
  a	
  2%	
  risk	
  (r)	
  that	
  the	
  data	
  becomes	
  publicly	
  
available	
  
	
  
Box 5: Modification
of health state description
•
•
•

After presenting this altered version of health state A, its valuation would then
continue as before. The resulting valuation of this health state, however, would give
an estimate of the utility of being in health state A in addition to having the
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corresponding level of privacy. In other words, utility levels elicited through the
proposed method, and the resulting QALYs, would incorporate the individual’s
privacy concerns. In such a way, the QALYs would present a more complete picture
of the monetary and non-monetary costs of the medical intervention.
The initial step in valuing privacy concerns in this way could take place in an unincentivized experimental setting. Two groups of individuals would be given Visual
Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off questions. One of them
would be faced with a health state description without the modifications specified
above in Box 5, and one of them would see the health state with these modifications.
If the privacy risks involved in data collection and storage are seen by patients as a
significant disutility in the context of healthcare, then one would expect the average
utility of patients under the modified health state (A’) to be lower than the utility of
the group facing the unmodified health state (A). The results of the valuation in both
groups would serve as an initial comparison. They would give an indication of the
value placed by patients on that type of loss of that particular kind of personal
information for that health benefit. Any large disparities between the modified health
state and the non-modified health state might indicate that the ranking of programs
based on traditional CEA methods does not represent true preferences.
C. Methodological Questions
There is ongoing debate as to which of the methods to estimate QALYs
mentioned in the previous section gives the most accurate results.62 For example,
while the Visual Analogue Scale is intuitively simple and quick to perform, some
have suggested that the method may suffer from various biases.63 Individuals often
avoid the extremes of the scale, leading to clustering around the middle values. From
this perspective, Standard Gamble and Time Trade-Off are more robust. Between
Standard Gamble and Time Trade-off, it has been suggested that Time-Trade-Off is
generally more robust,64 although this conclusion largely depends on the concrete
versions. Different valuation techniques can also perform better in different
contexts.65
The inclusion of privacy harm as an extra measure would probably not alter the
considerations regarding the issue of which of these valuation techniques is more
appropriate. Privacy concerns would need to be incorporated into each of the
valuations performed with these techniques without altering the considerations that
determine the choices among them.
Still, there are obstacles to these alterations of the Visual Analogue Scale,
Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off methods. The first obstacle is that
introducing a new variable and dimension into the elicitation technique in the form
of privacy concerns would increase its complexity and could potentially confuse
participants, resulting in less accurate measurements.
62

Erik Nord, Methods for Quality Adjustment of Life Years, 34 SOC. SCI. MED. 559, 560
(1992).
63

Parkin & Devlin, supra note 48.

64

Han Bleichrodt & Magnus Johannesson, Standard Gamble, Time Trade-Off and Rating
Scale: Experimental Results on the Ranking Properties of QALYs, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 155,
156 (1997).
65

Nord, supra note 62, at 559-60.
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To address the first obstacle, researchers would have to carefully design
elicitation techniques that avoid scenarios that are too complex. Even if this
modification is necessarily more intricate than health descriptions without privacy
concerns, the same argument can be made for any measurement that is incorporated
in the health state to measure patients’ well-being, such as anxiety or inability to
perform daily tasks. In turn, one of the advantages of this elicitation technique
compared to standard ways to measure privacy concerns is the visibility of the
comparable health states. Even if the elicitation technique with privacy concerns is
more complex than the same technique without them, it is still simpler than the
alternative methods to measure these same concerns.
The main potential obstacle in implementing this proposal is that including the
privacy concerns in the utility calculations would increase the amount of data
collection that a researcher would be required to perform. Currently, there are tables
produced by research groups that conveniently list the utilities of health states at
different dimensions of health, derived from a representative sample of a given
population.66 Using the above methods, researchers would no longer be able to use
these values directly and would instead have to collect data and administer the
elicitation techniques themselves. Consequently, widespread use of this method may
be costly unless the most commonly used databases of health utilities incorporate the
method.
If the obstacle to implementing the proposal turns out to be significant, it could
be an interesting alternative to repeat the QALY estimation and ICER calculation on
a few existing treatments with the inclusion of the altered elicitation techniques in
order to get an impression of how the ICER values would change in each case.
D. How Much is a QALY Worth
In developed countries, the ICER values for new treatments—the cost for public
health policies for increasing one QALY—typically lie between $50,000 and
$200,000, depending on context.67 ICER is usually compared to the lower bound of
that range, approximately $50,000.68 An ICER value below this amount is thought to
be good value for money. While this value is useful as a starting point, a large
amount of literature is aimed at determining a more accurate threshold that reflects
the value that society places on a QALY, rather than how much is usually spent on
one. If a convincing estimate can be made for this value, then all programs with an
ICER value below this point, which can give a person one quality adjusted life year
at a lower social cost, should be funded.
The standard alternative approach to ICER has been to derive a value using
traditional willingness-to-pay methodology, which has reached widely varied
66

The most frequently used database of health utilities is the EQ-5D, produced by the
EuroQol Group. The database uses five dimensions to separate health states: mobility, selfcare, usual activities, pain or discomfort and anxiety or depression. Another method is HUI3,
which uses eight dimensions: vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, pain, dexterity, cognition,
and emotional state. See Brazier et al., supra note 41.
67
CAM DONALDSON ET AL., EUROPEAN VALUE OF A QUALITY ADJUSTED LIFE YEAR 32-33
(2011).
68

Richard A. Hirth et al., Willingness to Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year in Search of
a Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 332-33 (2000).
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estimations.69 Some research based on the willingness-to-pay methodology has
valued QALYs at an average of €306,000 ($346,160) for thirty-five estimates.70
However, most research has found lower monetary estimations for the willingness to
pay for QALYs, closer, but still higher, than the lower bound of ICER values. In the
European Union, a EuroVaQ report covering ten representative European countries
reached an average willingness to pay of €65,000 ($73,510) per QALY.71 A study
surveying the literature on the topic has found that most estimations range between
€100,000 and €150,000 ($113,000 and $169,700) per QALY.72 If these studies are
accurate, they seem to indicate that people value QALYs, on average, at higher
values than what is socially spent on them.73
Another alternative approach can be found in Value of Statistical Life research,
which is one of the most prominent examples of an objective measure of willingness
to pay to avoid immaterial losses. The Value of Statistical Life literature attempts to
monetize the probability of (essentially non-monetary) fatal accidents by asking how
much a potential victim would be willing to pay to avoid facing a risk.74 When
people engage in dangerous behavior, such as buying a risky product or performing a
risky job, they are implicitly making a trade-off between money and their own
safety. This choice would allow for estimating the value that they place on their own
lives or their own characteristics, assuming perfect rationality and information. An
aggregation of those values can in return provide the statistical value of a life.75
Most of the losses that the Value of Statistical Life literature considers are nonpecuniary losses,76 which encompass losses that are non-monetary; accordingly, a
monetary compensation cannot always leave the victim equally well-off.77 Since a
loss in privacy is, in essence, non-pecuniary,78 this method could be well equipped in
dealing with its abstract nature.
69

Id. at 332.

70

Id. at 338.

71

CAM DONALDSON ET AL., supra note 67.

72

See Don Kenkel, WTP- and QALY-Based Approaches to Valuing Health for Policy:
Common Ground and Disputed Territory, 34 ENV'T. & RESOURCE ECON. 419 (2006).
73

Additionally, this would suggest that more money could be spent in public healthcare
before reaching people’s average willingness to pay for health benefits.
74
See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review
of Market Estimates Throughout the World (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 9487, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9487.
75

See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for
Wrongful Death and Personal Injury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113 (2007); Eric A. Posner &
Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Lives,
Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (2004).
76

See Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 93 NW.
U. L. REV. 876 (1989) [hereinafter Miller, Willingness to Pay].
77
Louis Visscher, Time is Money? A Law and Economics Approach to 'Loss of Time' as
Non-Pecuniary Loss, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 35, 35-36 (2014) [hereinafter Visscher, Time is
Money?].
78
When a person faces a privacy violation, his reduction in utility cannot be fully repaired
by a monetary compensation. The compensation can attempt to increase his utility to leave
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The value of QALYs has not been estimated with the Value of Statistical Life
approach. However, one could expect the Value of Statistical Life approach to value
QALYs much higher than the willingness-to-pay methodology. This is because the
Value of Statistical Life methods consider both material and immaterial losses, while
QALY only considers immaterial losses.79
V. NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES
A. Advantages Over Alternative Methods
There are several reasons why capturing privacy concerns in QALYs would be
superior to the other available methods. Life states are goods more easily comparable
between each other than are privacy versus monetary benefits. Consequently,
individuals would better grasp the value of their private information and, therefore,
the value of their privacy, when it is presented in a trade-off between different health
states, as opposed to a trade-off between privacy and money. It is difficult for
people, both in surveys and in a laboratory, to allocate a monetary value to
something as abstract as privacy. But it is possible for individuals to compare two
concrete and plausible life states and decide which one they prefer. In such a way,
the method combines the best features of the surveys and experiments performed in
the past in order to quantify privacy concerns. Like the experiments, it presents
people with a trade-off that can elicit more precise answers than abstract questions.
Like the surveys, it makes privacy issues more visible.
Additionally, eliciting privacy concerns via comparisons between health states is
highly relevant in the particular context of privacy issues raised by the collection of
data by e-health treatments. The valuations obtained with the method proposed here
will allow policymakers to directly measure the patient’s privacy costs in the context
of health states, eliminating the intermediate step of applying general privacy
valuations to the medical context. Compared to methods that rely on monetization,
the method proposed here presents a much more direct way of measuring privacy
concerns associated with medical interventions.
Further, the proposed method can be altered to determine which types of
collection methods and treatment-associated risks individuals are most responsive.
The proposed method may be repeated with varying values of r to assess the
sensitivity of the individual to different probabilities of data breach. For example, it
may be the case that until a certain risk occurs, people are indifferent to a potential
data leak.80 A further informative alteration to the method would be to change the
type of data being collected. This modification would allow for measurements of
how much more people value certain types of personal data over others. For
him in a similar position as the one he was before, but it can never leave him in exactly the
same position.
79

Vaia Karapanou & Louis Visscher, The Magnitude of Pain and Suffering Damages from
a Law and Economics and Health Economics Point of View (Rotterdam Inst. L. Econ.
Working Paper No. 2009/02, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327793 [hereinafter Karapanou
& Visscher, Magnitude of Pain].
80

This could be expected given people’s non-linear assessments of probabilities. See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 341 (1983).
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instance, one can expect that preferences elicited based on collection of a patient’s
heart rate would be lower than those based on the collection of sexually transmitted
infections histories.
B. How QALYs Fit the Law
There are two further reasons to incorporate the policy suggestion made here.
One reason to incorporate it is that QALYs were shown to be fitting to quantification
in law.81 Another reason is that the proposal fits with the reason why CEA and
QALYs exist in the first place.
The use of QALYs has been proposed in other areas to guide legal valuations on
losses of quality of life.82 Their use has been suggested to estimate damages based on
detailed and tailored scales in jury trials83 and within more general approaches that
incorporate QALYs in tort law as a tool to quantify pain and suffering damages.84
The tort use of the metric includes the possibility of considering QALYs as a way to
estimate the value of loss of time.85 The fundamental idea behind this approach is
that the extent to which tort law should compensate victims can be measured by how
much they would have been willing to pay to prevent those losses in the first place
when evaluated from an ex-ante perspective.86
QALYs provide a more objective way to compare different kinds of immaterial
losses.87 The more objective nature of QALYs makes them fitting to quantify
immaterial losses in fields where this quantification would be helpful, or even
necessary, to take these losses into account. The estimation of damages in tort law
and the evaluation of treatments in public health policy, particularly within the CEA

81

Ted R. Miller, Valuing Nonfatal Quality of Life Losses with Quality-Adjusted Life
Years: The Health Economist’s Meow, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 145, 145 (2000) [hereinafter
Miller, Valuing Nonfatal Quality].
82

Vaia Karapanou & Louis Visscher, Towards a Better Assessment of Pain and Suffering
Damages, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 48, 48, 55 (2010) [hereinafter Karapanou & Visscher, Better
Assessment of Damages].
83

Miller, Willingness to Pay, supra note 76.

84

See Karapanou & Visscher, Better Assessment of Damages, supra note 82, at 48;
Karapanou & Visscher, Magnitude of Pain, supra note 79; Vaia Karapanou & Louis Visscher,
Quality Adjusted Life Years as a Way Out of the Impasse between Prevention Theory and
Insurance Theory (Rotterdam Inst. L. Econ. Working Paper No. 2010/06, 2010),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1666141 [hereinafter Karapanou & Visscher, Way Out of the
Impasse].
85
Visscher, Time is Money?, supra note 77. The paper reached to an average amount of
2.50 Euros per hour. For an application of QALY to Dutch tort law specifically within the
same stream of literate, see Louis Visscher, QALY-tijd in de vaststelling van smartengeld bij
letsel?, 4 TIJDSCHR. VOOR VERGOED. PERS. 93 (2013) (Neth.).
86
Visscher, Time is Money?, supra note 77; Karapanou & Visscher, Better Assessment of
Damages, supra note 82.
87

Karapanou & Visscher, Magnitude of Pain, supra note 79; Karapanou & Visscher,
Better Assessment of Damages, supra note 82, at 49.
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literature, fall within these fields where quantification of immaterial is necessary for
accuracy.88
Comparing QALY values gives an estimation of the relative values of different
possible treatments for the patient,89 so the estimation should be as accurate as
possible. For privacy in e-health, estimations are easier and more straightforward
than they are in the context of tort law, as in the context of e-health they need not
assume instrumental rationality.
The CEA literature, in which QALYs are traditionally embedded, was largely
born out of a necessity to formally measure all costs and benefits of any particular
treatment in the face of difficult policy decisions stemming from large healthcare
costs and limited resources. When maximizing patients’ well-being subject to a
budgetary constraint, there was no reason to take into account solely the monetary
costs and benefits of each possible treatment. Similarly, in the face of growing
concerns about privacy and as new medical interventions appear that track and store
sensitive patient information, there is no reason to ignore this dimension of patients’
well-being.
Insofar as privacy is an important consideration for patients’ well-being, it is
sensible to impose some qualifier on e-health treatments by giving prevalence to
those that avoid collecting large amounts of sensitive data or restrict such collection
to the data that are strictly necessary for the treatment. This goal can be done
formally through the CEA method described in the previous section.
With the suggested policy, the ICER values of treatments will reflect societal
preferences more accurately. Imagine that there are two potential treatments, A and
B, which are equal in terms of monetary costs and (standard) QALY improvement
when compared to the current treatment. However, treatment A involves the
collection of data on patients’ medical history and its dissemination among a
network of healthcare employees while treatment B does not. The current
calculations of the ICER will give the impression that both treatments are identically
beneficial. However, if patients prefer not to have their data collected, thereby
preferring treatment B over treatment A, the treatments will not be equally beneficial.
The calculation should be different because their wellbeing will be different under
each treatment.
C. Advancing Policy Discussions
Another advantage of the suggested policy is that, given that it would allow for
more accurate measurements of privacy costs, it would help advance the broader
88

One should note that the tort law suggestions are made in the institutional context of
European Tort Law, which has a much more limited recognition of pain and suffering
damages than its American counterpart. The proposal of QALYs in tort law, therefore, means
to expand the recognition of pain and suffering damages, not contract it as it probably would
in American law.
For the Netherlands in particular, where this proposal was made, the EuroVaQ report of 2010
derived amounts of willingness to pay of between 34,000 and 43,000 Euros per QALY. For
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discussion surrounding privacy and e-health. So far, there is little indication of how
important privacy really is to patients and how important it should be for doctors and
policymakers, especially in the face of possible health gains. Including privacy
concerns in CEA through QALYs would give a concrete measure of its importance.
Two major healthcare failures illustrate the usefulness of advancing the privacy
discussion in this direction and the tensions that would be resolved.90 In the United
Kingdom, an initiative of the National Health Service created a database of
harmonized patient records named care.data with the idea that insurance and drug
companies could purchase statistical health data from the database.91 The initiative,
however, was halted after complaints from both patients and doctors.92 Patients and
doctors specifically raised complaints about the right to object to the collection of
data under European Data Protection Law,93 how the information would be used and
stored securely, and the burden on doctors.94 The rollout of the scheme has been
postponed at the time of writing this article in order to “listen and act on the views of
patients, the public, GPs and stakeholders, and to explain the benefits and risks
involved,”95 and it will likely be cancelled in the near future.
The Netherlands put forth a proposal similar to the United Kingdom’s scheme
through the Elektronisch Patiëntendossier (Electronic Patients’ File). The Electronic
Patients’ File proposed to assemble the different pieces of information that doctors
and healthcare providers possessed for each patient across the country.96 A unified
database would facilitate information sharing among different medical professionals
and other healthcare providers to improve the quality, safety, and efficiency of
healthcare for Dutch patients.97 However, this initiative was also stopped due to
90
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privacy concerns.98 In particular, the public was concerned with the broad scope of
people that would have access to the data and the enhanced risks of having such
large amounts of sensitive information in one single database, given the possibility
of personal data being leaked.99
The rollout of both care.data and the Electronic Patients’ File failed because the
general public became wary about the access and security of their personal data,
probably legitimately so.100 The creators of the policies did not sufficiently take into
account privacy considerations when creating or developing these policies. In failing
to consider privacy concerns, the policies resulted in significant amounts of efforts
and money going to waste.
The creators of the policies might have cared about privacy, and they most surely
cared about their policies’ long-term success, but they did not have a tool to
accurately estimate the weight that they should have given to privacy concerns.101
Different versions of both of these policies, incorporating privacy concerns, could
have withstood public scrutiny. As these examples illustrate, this article’s proposal
would not only benefit patients, but would also protect policies from failure after the
government has already invested significant money and resources. Even if the
method turned to be inaccurate as a tool for predicting constituents’ privacy
concerns, it could show that privacy concerns were seriously taken into account,
therefore eliminating the discussion’s dichotomy and providing a common ground
for deliberation.
D. Doctrinal Implications
While exploring in detail the legal framework of privacy in health is beyond the
scope of this article, mapping how its underlying principles can be better achieved
by the proposal made here can be useful to understand the normative implications of
the policies just described.
98
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The law recognizes already the importance of privacy specifically for medical
data. Health data are riskier and more sensitive than other kinds of personal data, and
their special legal protection reflects this increased importance and sensitivity.102 In
the U.S., patients’ health data are protected by various specific regulations that
capture the increased sensitivity of medical data when compared to other kinds of
personal data and grant medical data enhanced protection, the most important of
these being the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).103 But
HIPAA covers only the privacy and security of clinical data (not commercial data)
that are managed by a healthcare organization. E-Health devices that do not fit into
this category fall into standard consumer protection and contract law. According to
the Federal Trade Commission, these privacy claims would need a contractual
basis.104
Similarly, in the E.U. Data Protection Framework, the idea of the increased
sensitivity of medical data is captured in the provisions of the Data Protection
Directive regarding health data, but in a much broader way.105 In line with its
increased sensitivity, the current Directive and the coming GDPR establish health
data as a special category, requiring a higher level of protection in the form of
consent for such data collection or processing.106
The proposal made here advances the aims of these legal frameworks in two
ways. The first relates to consent. The second relates to common fair information
practice principles.
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In both of the jurisdictions described, the key aspect of health data’s special
protection when compared to other forms of data revolves around the increased
importance of consent.107 Although regulations differ from one jurisdiction to
another, the patient’s consent is necessary to transfer medical data to a third party in
all jurisdictions.108 The role that the consent requirement plays in determining
medical treatments is addressing the need to ensure that patients are informed of all
aspects of the technology, including the privacy aspect.
It is impossible for healthcare providers to inform patients of treatments’ privacy
consequences if they ignore these consequences themselves. Thus, the method
proposed here is a useful exercise not only for health policy to determine the best
medical treatments under all dimensions, but also to pull doctor-patient relations
closer to HIPAA standards. By making privacy costs salient to healthcare providers,
it enables them to communicate all implications of medical treatments to patients
and makes a step forward towards patients’ consent.109
The proposal is also supported by a substantive interpretation of widespread fair
information practice principles—in particular, the collection limitation principle and
the purpose specification principle. The collection limitation principle, besides
mandating that information collection be limited and performed through lawful and
fair means, suggests that it must be minimal for the purpose to which the collection
takes place,110 an idea that is also reflected in HIPAA’s minimum necessary
standard.111 The purpose specification principle and, indirectly, the data quality
principle, establish that the collection of data must be relevant for the purpose of the
collection.112
A health policy that approves medical treatments without measuring each
treatment’s impact on privacy will often—if not always—breach these principles, as
it will be blind to data collection and processing. Currently, it is difficult—if not
107
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impossible—to know whether a treatment (A) is necessary or proportionate
compared to another less privacy invasive treatment (B). In the simplest case, where
A and B achieve the same result, some account of their privacy aspects must take
place to illustrate the superiority of A and avoid leaving a healthcare provider
indifferent between them. In a more interesting case, where A provides a slightly
better health benefit, but is significantly more privacy-invasive than B, a method of
quantification like the one proposed here allows for comparison in accordance with
these principles. This method could potentially show a disproportion such that we
would not consider treatment A to be acceptable. Thus, these fair information
practice principles would be better fulfilled with the method proposed here.
VI. CONCLUSION
As medical treatments have become increasingly invasive and data intensive,
concerns have been raised regarding the privacy of patients.113 The discussion
regarding privacy concerns has become increasingly important for both medical
professionals and patients, resulting in some interventions being halted in order to
assess the possibility of data breaches. 114
This article proposes a method to formalize the discussion regarding privacy
concerns by giving some indication of the value of personal information in a medical
context and by including privacy in the overall costs and benefits of a given medical
program. This article suggests this be accomplished by incorporating privacy
concerns into the cost-effectiveness framework that is already established and in use
in public health policy.
In order to incorporate privacy into the cost-effectiveness ratio, some kind of cost
must be assigned to a decline in privacy. It was shown, however, that measuring the
“price” of privacy through monetary costs is a difficult procedure that often results in
paradoxical and inconsistent results, especially when the trade-off is presented in the
typical context of purchase history information.
If monetization of privacy harms is to be attempted, I suggest, as a second best
option, similar trade-off experiments where the data being collected are instead
presented as sensitive health information. Experimental settings should be wary of
the variable value of different types of information and the effects of privacy risk
awareness. Therefore, this method would give more accurate results.
To more adequately measure privacy concerns, the current approach should shift
to incorporate a method whereby the cost of privacy is embedded in the
measurements of health states. Using the Visual Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble,
and Time-Trade-Off methods with minor alterations yields utility measurements of a
given health state, as well as a given level of privacy invasion. These methods can be
extended to measure utility under different categories of information and
probabilities of data breach. In this framework, the costs and benefits of a treatment
are explicitly measured, and treatments with a high amount of data collection and a
higher probability of making sensitive data public are given a concrete penalty,
which allows for an objective comparison between potential medical interventions.
If the proposed policy suggestion were to be followed in a few e-health
treatments, its results could be tested against existing economic evaluations of
different health treatments (QALY and ICER) in order to compare the outcomes of
113
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the standard evaluations with those of the proposed application. The expected
outcome of this test is that e-health treatments involving any kind of patient
surveillance—and in particular, remote patient monitoring—will rank lower than in
standard tests, accounting for the introduced privacy violations. It is uncertain,
however, how much lower they will rank, and it will remain so until these
evaluations are performed.115 Even when incorporating privacy elements, medical
treatments would retain some, if not most, of their usefulness.
Either way, such tests would push forward the discussion of privacy in medicine
by giving us an objective measure. It would indicate if and how much we should
take privacy concerns in e-health into account.

115

Individuals may be more sensitive to breaches of medical data, but they may also be
more responsive to health benefits.
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